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Mill once asked, "Wasthere any domination which did not appearnaturalto those that
possessed it?" (Mill 1984, 269-270). For
same-sex couples seeking access to the institution of marriage,the public sense that marriage is naturallyand obviously meant only
for opposite-sexcouples has been a formidable barrier.The first state supremecourtsto
rule on same-sex marriage,in the early 1970s,
simply relied upon dictionarydefinitionsto
hold that marriagewas obviously a heterosexual institution.!Politiciansmostly ignoredthe
issue altogetheruntil the courtsof Hawaii,
Vermont,and Massachusettsforced public
debateof the issue.
Over the past severalyears, things have
changed.In this brief article,I arguethat
there has been a serious divergencein how
the courts and non-judicialpolitical figures
have engaged the issue of same-sexmarriage,
with the courts well out in front in terms of
moving past the reflexive notion that
marriagesimply has
to
be opposite-sex.
Gerstmann,
There is a lively
Marymount
University
debate aboutwhether
courts are primarily
interpretersof law or operatemainly as institutions throughwhich judges follow their policy preferences(e.g., Segal and Spaeth 1999;
Gillman2001; Volokh2001). Certainly,this
article will not resolve that debate.Nonetheless, it is instructiveto comparethe reaction
of the public and non-judicialpoliticiansto
that of the courtsin responseto the increasingly urgentpressingby same-sex couples for
legal recognitionof their relationships.While
the public and elected officials have felt free
to continuethe mantrathat exclusion of samesex couples from marriageis obviously right,
courts have moved past their initial dismissiveness and are more rigorouslyengagingthis issue.
Courts,unlike the public, legislators,or
executiveofficials, are obliged to actually
considerand respondto facts and arguments
presentedby the gay and lesbian advocates.
Further,courtsmust publicly set out the reasons for their decisions in writing.As a result,
the courts have been bastionsof rationalityin
dealing with same-sex marriage,as compared
to other governmentalactors,outside of a
small numberof enclaves such as San
Francisco.So far, two state high courts,the
SupremeJudicialCourtof Massachusettsand
PSOnlinewww.apsanet.org

the SupremeCourtof Hawaii,have held that
same-sex couples are legally entitledto get
married,and the SupremeCourtof Vermont
has held that same-sex couples are entitledto
all the legal rights of marriage.2What has
been less commentedupon is that even some
appellatecourtsfrom "redstates"have engaged the questionof same-sex marriage
much more seriouslythan other government
officials and they have struggledto give a
cogent explanationfor excludingsame-sex
couples from marriage.In the most recent
case, an Indianaappellatedecision renderedin
January2005, the same-sexplaintiffsdid not
prevail,but the courts in these cases conceded
them a great deal of ground,and ultimately
based their decisions on groundswide open to
criticaldissectionin futurelitigation.
This is not to say that victory for same-sex
plaintiffsis inevitable.As noted, not only do
many believe thatjudges pursuetheir own
policy preferences,but there is widespread
disagreementaboutwhethercourtscan or
should rule for same-sexmarriagerights given
their institutionallimitations,their countermajoritarianrole, and the possibilityof violent
backlash,amongother reasons(see, e.g.,
Sunstein 1994). Nonetheless,I arguehere that
the groundsupon which courts are now distinguishing between same-sexand opposite-sex
couples, i.e., the capacityto reproduceby accident, is ultimatelyso narrowthat the courts
will have to abandonthis line of reasoning,
promisingat least the possibilityof future
victory for same-sex plaintiffs.
Unlike the courts,public officials do not
need to defend their positions on issues in
any sort of rigorousanalyticmanner.During
his presidentialrun, John Kerryfrequently
averredthat he opposed same-sex marriage,
but never explainedhis position beyond saying, "I personallybelieve that marriageis
between a man and a woman."3Even Senator
Hillary RodhamClintonhas not gone beyond
the argumentthat marriageis only for
opposite-sexcouples because that is the way
things have always been. In January2000,
she said, "Marriagehas got historic, religious,
and moral contentthat goes back to the beginning of time, and I think a marriageis as
a marriagehas always been: between a man
and a woman."4
By contrast,the courtshave addressedthis
issue far more substantially.In Lawrencev.
Texas(2003), while strikingthe sodomy laws
of Texas, the SupremeCourtcautionedagainst
sweeping and simplisticaccountsof history,
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and assertedthat history and traditionare only the beginning
points of any discussionof the basic rights of humanbeings.
The Courtdid not specificallyaddressthe issue of same-sex
marriage;insteadit simply noted that the case "does not involve whetherthe governmentmust give formalrecognitionto
any relationshipthat homosexualpersons seek to enter."In
dissent, Justice Scalia assertedthat the Court'sdecision in
Lawrence"leaveson prettyshaky groundsstate laws limiting
marriageto opposite-sexcouples."
Indeed,now that Lawrencehas done away with sodomy
laws, it is not at all clear why same-sexcouples shouldbe
barredfrom marriage.As noted, this has not affectedthe rhetoric of public officials who still see no need to explain their
oppositionto same-sexmarriage.The courts,however,have
been obliged to give more thoughtfulanswersto the question
of why only opposite-sexcouple may wed. Since Lawrence,
two appellatecourts,one in Arizonaand one in Indiana,have
issued opinions on same-sexmarriage.Both courts,relying on
similarreasoning,denied the same-sexpetitioners'claims for
relief. This articlefocuses on the recent Indianacase,
Morrisonv. Sadler.
The Morrisoncourtbegan by noting that, afterLawrence,
moraldisapprovalof same-sex relationshipsas a constitutional
basis for denyingthe right to marrywas no longer tenable,
despite the urgingsof amicus groups such as CatholicsAllied
for the Faith.Nor did the court resortto the simplistic
dictionary-basedargumentsthat marriagewas opposite sex "by
definition."With these argumentsdiscardedor abandoned,the
Indianacourt focused on the same issue as the Arizonacourt:
the inabilityof same-sex couples to bear childrenvia sexual
intercourse.I arguethat if the same-sex marriageban rests on
this argument,then it rests on very thin groundindeed, and
that the courtshave had to grow quite narrowin focus in
orderto sustainit.
I have arguedextensivelyelsewhere(Gerstmann2003) that
while the governmentalinterestin the well-being of childrenis
strong,there is no logical relationshipbetween the same-sex
marriageban and children'swell-being,even if one accepts
the argumentthat opposite-sexcouples are inherentlybetter
parentsthan same-sex couples. In fact, the Indianacourt did
not give credenceto this argument,saying that "we accept that
there are a growingnumberof studies indicatingthat same-sex
couples are at least as successful at raisingchildrenas opposite-sex couples."Instead,the court merely statedthat it was a
legislativetask to make such a determination.
Nonetheless,even deferringto the legislatureon this issue,
there is still no logical connectionbetween banningsame-sex
marriageand maximizingthe chances that childrenwill be
broughtup by opposite-sex,marriedparents.The actual effect
of the ban is to bar childrenalreadybeing raised in same-sex
householdsfrom the protectionaffordedby the benefits of
marriage.Further,this has the irrationaleffect of punishing
childrenfor the "sins"of their parents.Even if we assume
that gays and lesbians are wrong to live with a same-sex partner, this is obviously not the moral responsibilityof the child.
Long ago, in Levy v. Louisiana,the SupremeCourtstruck
down as irrationala law that preventedan illegitimatechild
from suing for wrongfuldeath when the child's motherwas
killed. The justices held that it is irrationalto punish a child
for the perceivedsins of the parent.Likewise, it is irrational
to punish the childrenof same-sex couples by denying them
the legal rights they would have if same-sex marriagewere
legal.
Furthermore,if marriageis primarilyabout providing a
stable environmentfor children, then the currentrules on
who may marryand who may not are poorly suited to this
purpose.After all, opposite-sex couples are allowed to marry
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whether or not they intend to, or are capable of, having
children. Some courts, including the Arizona court, have
said that inquiries into the willingness or capacity of
opposite-sex couples to bear children would violate their
privacy.This is a difficult argumentto sustain. First of all,
there are some groups, such as, for example, very elderly
women, who cannot bear children.Yet, it is inconceivable
that any legislator who wished to keep his or her job would
argue that, say, because their reproductiveyears are over
women over the age of 80 should be banned from marriage
and the legal and financial benefits it affords. Such a ban
would not necessarily violate the constitutionaldoctrine of
equal protection(the governmentis allowed to treat men
and women differently when there are real differences in
their situation),but would no doubt be seen as cruel and
pointless. Why is it any less so when same-sex couples are
banned from marriagefor this reason?
The Indianacourtdealt with this argument,in part,by noting that the legislationis not to be overturned"merelybecause
it is not framedwith such mathematicalnicety as to include
all within the reasonfor the classificationand to exclude all
others."This is a well-knownprincipleof law, but linking
opposite-sexstatusto child-rearinglacks more than "mathematicalnicety."While 46% of marriedopposite-sexcouples
are raisingchildrenunderthe age of 18 in their home, samesex couples are not far behind;34% of lesbian couples and
22% of male same-sex couples are raising childrenunderthe
age of 18 in their home (Simmonsand O'Connell2003).
These numberswould likely be even closer if same-sex couples could marryand we were comparingmarriedopposite-sex
couples to marriedsame-sexcouples. Far from merely reflecting differences,the law is, at least in part,creatingstatistical
differencesby forbiddingmarriageto opposite-sexcouples
who would like to create a more stable environmentfor their
children.
The categoriesof "child-raisers"
and "opposite-sexcouples"
overlappoorly, not only because it is true that many opposite
sex-couples cannotor will not have children,but also because,
as the above figures illustrate,a great many same-sexcouples
do have children,either by adoption,reproductivetechnology,
or from prioropposite-sexrelationshipsor encounters.The
same-sex marriageban denies childrenliving in same-sex
households,some 2-8 million in number(Patterson1995,
262), the benefitsand protectionsof having marriedparents.
The Indianacourt had difficultyjustifying a same-sex marriage ban on the inability to procreateas a rationalpolicy,
yet had to somehow distinguishbetween opposite-sex and
same-sex parents.The court began by noting that, while sexual intercoursecan quickly, unexpectedly,and cheaply result
in a pregnancy,artificialmethods of reproduction,and also
adoption,are time-consumingand expensive:
Likewise,the Plaintiffsessentiallycontend,it actuallywould
of
furtherthe State'sinterestsin marriageand the strengthening
familiesto allow same-sexcouplesto raisefamilieswithinthe
institutionof marriage.This argumentdoes not recognizethe
key differencebetweenhow most opposite-sexcouplesbecome
parents,throughsexualintercourse,and how all same-sexcouples mustbecomeparents,throughadoptionor assistedreproduction.Becominga parentby using "artificial"
reproduction
methodsis frequentlycostly andtime-consuming.
Adopting
childrenis muchthe same.Thosepersonswantingto have chilor adoptionare,by necessity,
drenby assistedreproduction
heavily invested, financially and emotionally, in those processes.

Thoseprocessesalso requirea greatdeal of foresightand planning. "Natural"procreation,on the other hand, may occur only
between opposite-sex couples and with no foresight or
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planning.All thatis requiredis one instanceof sexual
intercoursewith a manfor a womanto becomepregnant.5
Based upon this differencebetween reproductionby intercourse and reproductionby artificialmeans, the Indianacourt
concludedthat same-sex couples with childrenare actually so
stable that they do not need the institutionof marriageto
providea stable environment
for their children:
on the
Whatdoes the differencebetween"natural"
reproduction
one handand assistedreproduction
and adoptionon the other
meanfor constitutional
purposes?It meansthatit impactsthe
Stateof Indiana'sclearinterestin seeingthatchildrenare
raisedin stableenvironments.
Thosepersonswho haveinvested
the significanttime, effort,and expenseassociatedwith assisted
or adoptionmay be seen as very likely to be able
reproduction
to providesuch an environment,
with or withoutthe "protections"of marriage,becauseof the high level of financialand
emotionalcommitmentexertedin conceivingor adoptinga
child or childrenin the firstplace.By contrast,procreation
by
"natural"
reproduction
may occurwithoutany thoughtfor the
future.The State,firstof all, may legitimatelycreatethe institutionof opposite-sexmarriage,and all the benefitsaccruingto
it, in orderto encouragemale-femalecouplesto procreate
withinthe legitimacyand stabilityof a state-sanctioned
relabirths
tionshipandto discourageunplanned,out-of-wedlock
resultingfrom"casual"intercourse.Second,even wherean
opposite-sexcoupleentersinto a marriagewith no intentionof
do happen,or personsoften
havingchildren,"accidents"
their
minds
about
change
wantingto have children.The institution of marriagenot only encouragesopposite-sexcouplesto
forma relativelystableenvironment
for the "natural"
procreationof childrenin the firstplace,but it also encouragesthem
to stay togetherandraise a child or childrentogetherif there
is a "changein plans."6
Althoughthe same-sexplaintiffslost the case, the judicial
portrayalof same-sexcouples in this case is remarkablypositive. The courtacknowledgedthatthe greatweight of social
science dataindicatesthat "same-sexcouples are at least as successful at raisingchildrenas are opposite-sexcouples."'The
courtthen assertsthat same-sexcouples with childrenare likely
so committedto theirfamiliesthattheirchildrendo not have
the same need for marriedparentsas do childrenof oppositesex couples who may accidentallyblunderinto parenthoodafter
a carelesssexual encounter.To say the least, this presentsa
starkcontrastfrom the once ubiquitousimage of gays and lesbians as promiscuouspleasure-seekers
more likely to molest
childrenthanto nurturethem in loving, stablehomes.8
It also standsin sharpcontrastto much of the rhetoric
regardinggay families coming from our nation'sexecutive
branch,much of which still demonstratesunreflectivehostility.
Five days after the Indianadecision, PBS announcedthat, under heavy pressurefrom the U.S. Departmentof Education,it
was pulling from distributionan episode of "Postcardsfrom
Buster."Busteris an animatedrabbit,the friend of the popular
animatedaardvark"Arthur."
In the "Postcards"series he visits
a diversegroup of families, includingchildrenof single parand a family
ents, childrenwho live with their grandparents,
of fundamentalistMuslims, all withoutobjectionby the federal
government.In fact, Busterhimself is the child of divorced
parents.Yet his visit to a Vermontfamily with lesbian parents
promptedDepartmentof EducationSecretaryMargaret
Spelling to threatenPBS's federalfunding,assertingthat,
"Manyparentswould not want their young childrenexposed
to the lifestyles portrayedin the episode."9This hostilityto
same-sex families comes from the very top of the executive
branch,with a presidentwho denouncesjudicial efforts to
PSOnlinewww.apsanet.org

fairly engage the issue of same-sexmarriageas "activism"
dangerousto families and children.As recentlyas in his
February2, 2005, State of the Union Address,President
George W. Bush declared:"Becausemarriageis a sacred
institutionand the foundationof society, it shouldnot be redefined by activistjudges. For the good of families, childrenand
society, I supporta constitutionalamendmentto protectthe
institutionof marriage."Comparedto this open hostility to
same-sex marriage,and even comparedto the statementsof
liberal senatorssuch as Kerryand Clinton,the Indiana
decision is far more thoughtfuland far more laudatoryof
same-sex families.
What of that, though?Some advocatesof same-sexmarriage
might questionwhat good comes from positive portrayalsby
the courtswhen the end result is a loss for the plaintiffs.I
would arguethat there are potentiallytwo very significantbenefits to this respectfuljudicial descriptionof same-sexparents.
First, as I demonstrateelsewhere(Gerstmann1999), judicial
rhetoriccan have an importantimpactupon the broaderpolitical debate.The judicial hostility to gay and lesbian claims
expressedin the now-overruledBowers v. Hardwickserved as
justificationfor a wide arrayof sexual orientation-based
discrimination,as the Courtitself acknowledgedwhen it overturnedthat decision in Lawrencev. Texas.Further,the federal
courts'repeatedinsistencethat gays and lesbians do not
deserve the same level of legal protectionas groups such as
AfricanAmericanshas renderedgays and lesbians vulnerable
to the chargethat they are seeking "specialrights"that they
neitherneed nor deserve (Gerstmann1999). The interplay
betweenjudicial decisions and politics is complex,but to the
degree thatjudicial decisions affect the largerpolitical dialogue, the Indianadecision, along, of course, with Lawrence,
puts gays and lesbians seeking equal rights on far friendlier
groundsthan have past decisions.
Second, the Indianadecision rests on groundswide open to
legal attackon appealor in litigationin other states. Most obviously, there are many same-sexfamilies where the children
are not the result of reproductivetechnologyor adoption,but
of heterosexualintercourseperformedby one memberof the
couple. The Indianacourt acknowledgedthis but avoidedthe
problemsit createsfor the court'sreasoningby relying on an
omission in the plaintiffs'legal arguments:
It is possible,andindeedit likelyfrequentlyhappensthata
same-sexcouplemay raisea childor childrenthatone or both
membershad earlieras a resultof an opposite-sexrelationship.
The Plaintiffsfocus on same-sexcoupleswho have childrenby
assistedreproduction
and adoption.We do likewise,focusingon
the inabilityof a same-sexcoupleto have a child together
withinthe confinesof theirintimaterelationship.'1
This judicial parry can easily be counteredin future litigation by providing statistics on the numbersof same-sex
couples raising children born to one member of the couple
by ordinaryreproductivemeans. If the heterosexualmonopoly on marriagerests on such slim grounds,then there is
much reason for optimism that other courts will recognize
the right of same-sex couples to wed. As noted, there are
those who doubt that legal argumentsand logic are important predictorsof judicial outcomes, but for those who
believe that legal argumentshave at least some significant
effect on judicial outcomes (see, e.g., Epstein and Kobylka
1992), the courts' difficult struggle to differentiatebetween
opposite and same-sex parentsand the respective benefits of
marriagefor them, signals at least the possibility of future
success, especially as the idea of same-sex marriagegrows
less novel over time.
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Notes
1. The Supreme Court of Minnesota was the first high court to rule
against same-sex marriage(1971, Baker v. Nelson). The Kentucky
Supreme Court followed two years later in Jones v. Hallahan.
2. The decision of the Hawaiian court was effectively overruledby
popular referendumbefore it took effect.
3. CNN Crossfire (May 17, 2004): Transcript# 051700CN.V20.
4. Quoted in Andrew Sullivan, "State of the Union," The New Republic
18, 20 (May 8, 2000).

5. Morrison v. Sadler, at 19-20 (Lexis Pagination).
6. Morrison v. Sadler, at 20-21 (Lexis Pagination).
7. Morrison v. Sadler, at 27-28 (Lexis Pagination).
8. For example,contrastthis with the portrayalof gays and lesbiansin
Coloradoduringthe 1992 campaignto pass a stateconstitutional
amendmentrescindingcivil rightsprotectionsfor gays and lesbians.Gerstmann1999, 111-112).
9. U.S. Newswire, January28, 2005.
10. Morrison v. Sadler, at n.9.
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